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3 Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a).
4 See, e.g., Duffy v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-556
(taxpayer not in constructive receipt for wages withheld
to cover excess travel advances where taxpayer disputed
liability for excess advances).
5 Baxter v. Comm’r, 816 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1987), rev’g
on this issue, T.C. Memo. 1985-378.
6 John Single, Jr. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1988-549.
7 Bright v. United States, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,142 (5th Cir. 1991).
8 Id.
9 Ltr. Rul. 9651020, Sept. 19, 1996.
10 Id.
11 Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174.
12 Childs v. Comm’r, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)¶ 50,504
(11th Cir. 1996).
13 See, e.g., Romine v. Comm’r, 25 T.C. 859 (1956)
(constructive receipt as to livestock sold and delivered
one year with proceeds received early the following
year).
14 Rev. Rul. 58-162, 1958-1 C.B. 234.
15 See I.R.C. § 453(b)(2)(B).
16 Harl, “Installment Sales of Commodities and AMT,” 7
Agric. L. Dig. 93 (1996); Harl, “More on Installment
Sales of Commodities and AMT,” 7 Agric. L. Dig. 173
(1996).
17 Rev. Rul. 68-44, 1968-1 C.B. 191.  Compare Rev. Rul.
60-32, 1960-1 C.B. 29 (payments under Soil Bank Act
as income from “the normal use of the land devoted to
the program" were income in year received).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT. The plaintiffs owned
land which surrounded the land owned by the defendants
such that the only access to the defendants’ land was over
routes crossing the plaintiffs’ land. The plaintiffs brought
an action to quiet title to prohibit the defendants from
crossing the plaintiffs’ land. The trial court ruled that the
defendants had acquired a prescriptive easement to one
route over the plaintiffs’ land. The plaintiffs argued on
appeal that the defendants’ use of that route was permissive
and not adverse to the plaintiffs’ ownership. This argument
was based on the actions of the plaintiffs’ predecessors in
interest who had prohibited the defendants from using one
route and had allowed the defendants to use the route for
which the prescriptive easement was found. The court held
that the evidence showed that the predecessors in interest
had warned the defendants not to use any route and had
posted “no trespassing” signs on the route used by the
defendants. The court held that the defendants’ continued
use of the route after these actions demonstrated that the
use was adverse and not permissive. The plaintiff also
claimed that there was evidence that the defendants
consulted with the predecessors in interest about improving
the road and building a bridge on the route. The court held
that the trial court had the discretion whether to find this
evidence credible and that finding was not appealable.
Rafanelli v. Dale, 924 P.2d 242 (Mont. 1996).
ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff was a three-year-old child who
was visiting, with the plaintiff’s family, a neighbor of the
defendant. While the plaintiff was playing in the neighbor’s
yard, the plaintiff wandered into a horse pasture on the
defendant’s property where the plaintiff was injured when a
horse kicked the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed an action in
negligence and attractive nuisance. The pasture was
enclosed by a wire electric fence but the electricity was not
turned on at the time of the accident. The neighbor had
been specifically warned not to enter the pasture. The
plaintiff argued that the defendant was negligent because
the fence was insufficient to keep the child out of the
pasture. The court found that the horse involved was not
known to be aggressive and the fence was shown to be in
good repair. The court concluded that there was no
evidence that the defendant had not exercised reasonable
care in fencing in the horse. The plaintiff also argued that,
because the defendant had erected an electric fence, the
defendant was negligent in failing to have the electricity on
at the time of the accident. The plaintiff cited Section 324A
Restatement (Second) of Torts for the theory that the
erection of the electric fence was an undertaking and the
failure to electrify the fence was negligence in that
undertaking. The court held that Section 324A was
applicable only where the defendant undertook to perform a
service for the injured party. The court upheld the jury
verdict for the defendant. The plaintiff had also argued that
the attractive nuisance doctrine should be implemented in
Vermont but the court refused, holding that the attractive
nuisance doctrine merely provided a lesser standard of
negligence in certain circumstances, a basis of action
already allowed in Vermont under the general negligence
cause of action. Zukatis by Zukatis v. Perry, 682 A.2d
964 (Vt. 1996).
BANKRUPTCY
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ASSESSMENT. The debtors filed for Chapter 13 and
objected to claims for taxes filed by the IRS, arguing that
the debtors were not taxpayers or subject to the federal
income tax laws (a form of tax protester argument). The
court rejected the argument as frivolous. The debtors also
argued that the assessment was not valid because the notice
was merely a computer printed form without a signature
from an agent. The court also rejected this argument,
holding that the statute and regulations do not require a
signature on an assessment notice. See In re Hopkins, 192
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B.R. 760 (D. Nev. 1995). The IRS then moved to dismiss
the case for bad faith, based on the debtors’ failure to file
the income tax returns.  The court dismissed the case for
bad faith for failure to file the returns in addition to the
frivolous arguments made by the debtors for not filing the
returns. In re Hopkins, 201 B.R. 993 (D. Nev. 1996).
DISCHARGE. The debtor was employed as a car
salesman and overstated the number of dependents on the
debtor’s W-4 forms. The debtor held several different
employments over several years and some employers
treated the debtor as an independent contractor and did not
withhold any income taxes. The debtor filed fairly accurate
tax returns for the periods involved and made a good faith
effort to pay the taxes owed. The IRS sought a ruling that
the taxes for years more than three years before the
bankruptcy filing were nondischargeable for willful
attempts to evade taxes. The court held that a pattern of
false W-4 forms was not sufficient indication of willful
attempts to evade taxes where the debtor filed timely and
accurate returns and attempted to pay the taxes.  The
appellate court reversed, holding that the facts presented
sufficient evidence of willful intent to evade taxes to
prevent discharge of the taxes.  In re Smith, 202 B.R. 277
(S.D. Ind. 1996), rev’g and rem’g, 169 B.R. 55 (Bankr.
S.D. Ind. 1994).
The taxpayer had been assessed for 1987 taxes more
than 240 days before the filing of a bankruptcy petition.
However, during the period between the assessment and the
bankruptcy filing, the taxpayer had signed a waiver of the
statute of limitations as part of an offer of compromise. The
offer was rejected but appealed. During the appeal an IRS
agent sent to the taxpayer a letter indicating that the appeal
would be rejected unless the taxpayer included additional
items in the offer of compromise. The court held that the
letter was sufficient to operate as a rejection of the offer of
compromise and terminated the waiver of the statute of
limitations; therefore, more than 240 days passed between
the assessment and the petition when the waiver was not in
existence, and the taxes involved were dischargeable. In re
Hobbs, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,127 (Bankr. N.D.
Iowa 1996).
ESTATE PROPERTY . As part of a collection effort,
the IRS, on October 3, 1995, served a notice of levy against
the debtor’s bank account. On October 20, 1995, the debtor
filed for Chapter 13 and on October 25, 1995, the bank
delivered the amount in the account on the day of the levy
to the IRS. The debtor sought turnover of the funds
collected from the levy. The issue was whether the funds
became property of the estate upon the bankruptcy filing.
The court focused on Treas. Reg. § 301.6332-3(c)(2) which
provides that interest accruing on a levied bank account
during the 21 day wait period is treated as income to the
account holder, although the interest is also subject to the
levy. The court used this plus the precedent of Giaimo v.
U.S., 194 B.R. 210 (E.D. Mo. 1996) to hold that the debtor
had sufficient interest in the bank account after the levy and
during the 21 day wait period for the funds to be estate




CROP INSURANCE. The FCIC has adopted as final
regulations which include the Florida Citrus Endorsement
in the Common Crop Insurance Policy and restrict the
endorsement provisions to 1997 and earlier crop years. 61
Fed. Reg. 68998 (Dec. 31, 1996).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations which move
the noninsured crop disaster assistance program (NAP)
provisions currently in 7 CFR Part 404 to 7 CFR Part 1437,
and which implement the amendments to NAP made in
Title I of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform
Act of 1996 (the 1996 Act). The 1996 Act changes the
administration of the program from the Federal Crop
Insurance Corporation (FCIC) to the Secretary through the
Commodity Credit Corporation. The NAP program will
continue to be operated through the Farm Service Agency
(FSA). Other amendments include the addition of seed
crops and aquaculture (including ornamental fish) as crops
eligible for benefits under this part, and the amendments
relax the acreage and production reporting requirements. 62
Fed. Reg. 69004 (Dec. 31, 1996).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations which
include the Hybrid Corn Seed Endorsement in the Common
Crop Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement
provisions to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62 Fed. Reg. 48
(Jan. 2, 1997).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations which
include the Fresh Market Sweet Corn Endorsement in the
Common Crop Insurance Policy and restrict the
endorsement provisions to 1997 and earlier crop years. 62
Fed. Reg. 333 (Jan. 3, 1997).
The FCIC has issued proposed regulations which
include the Pepper Crop Endorsement in the Common Crop
Insurance Policy and restrict the endorsement provisions to




ALIMONY PAYMENTS. The decedent had divorced
from the spouse and the divorce decree provided for annual
alimony payments. When the decedent died, the surviving
ex-spouse filed a claim for arrearages in the alimony
payments and eventually received the decedent’s entire
estate in satisfaction of the arrearages. The estate treated
the amount paid as distributive net income. However, the
court held that the payments were to be treated as alimony
payments, entirely taxable to the surviving ex-spouse and
her estate when the ex-spouse died before the distribution.
The court held that the decedent’s estate was not entitled to
a deduction for the payment because the deduction was
available only for trusts and individuals. Kitch v. Comm’r,
97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,124 (10th Cir. 1996).
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent had executed a will in 1973 which provided for a
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marital trust for the surviving spouse which was funded
with 50 percent of the estate in order to take advantage of
the maximum marital deduction available at the time. The
will also provided for another trust which had a spendthrift
clause. The marital trust was designated as trust A and the
non-marital trust was designated as trust B. In 1982, the
will was amended to provide for $2 million of assets to
pass to the non-marital trust, redesignated as trust A, and
the remainder to pass to the marital trust, redesignated as
trust B, again in order to take advantage of the unlimited
marital deduction and QTIP provisions available at that
time. The marital trust was set up to be QTIP. However, the
amended will unknowingly retained the spendthrift clause
as to trust B, now the marital trust. The IRS claimed that
the will provided for application of the spendthrift clause
against the marital trust, thus limiting the surviving
spouse’s rights to the trust income. In addition, the IRS
claimed that the will allowed the trustee to pay some
expenses from the marital trust. The estate claimed that the
application of the spendthrift and expense provisions was
inadvertently not changed to reflect the change in
designation of the trusts as A and B. The court found that
the will was ambiguous in that the IRS interpretation was
contrary to will provisions devising all the remaining assets
to the marital trust.  Therefore, the court held that the
spendthrift clause and expense payment provisions did not
apply to the marital trust and the entire QTIP trust was
eligible for the marital deduction. Miller v. U.S., 1997
DTR 3d 20, ___ F. Supp. ___ (N.D. Ohio 1996).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
NEW FARM INCOME TAX LEGISLATION
Two bills have been introduced in the Congress
affecting recent developments in farm income tax. The first
bill, H.R. 426, introduced by Rep. Nethercutt with 81 co-
sponsors and bipartisan support, repeals the inclusion of
income from the sale of farm property (grain, other crops
and livestock) from alternative minimum tax for taxpayers
using the cash method of tax accounting. The new rule
would be effective retroactively to 1986 when the previous
rule was enacted. The second bill, H.R. 86, introduced by
Rep. Smith of Michigan with 44 co-sponsors and bipartisan
support, allows taxpayers with income from a farming
business to elect to use two year income averaging for the
income from that business. Farming income includes gain
from the sale of property (except land) regularly used in the
farming business for a substantial period before the sale.
For discussion fo the AMT problem see Harl, “Installment
Sales of Commodities and AMT,” 7 Agric. L. Dig. 93
(1996); Harl, “More on Installment Sales of Commodities
and AMT,” 7 Agric. L. Dig. 173 (1996).
ADOPTION EXPENSES. The IRS has provided
guidance for claiming the tax credit for individuals and the
exclusion from income for employers for costs related to
adoptions, as allowed by Sections 23, and 137 of the Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996. Notice 97-9, I.R.B.
1997-_, __.
C CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02.*
REORGANIZATIONS. The IRS has issued proposed
regulations providing that for certain reorganizations,
transfers by the acquiring corporation of target assets or
stock to certain controlled corporations, and under
prescribed conditions, transfers of target assets to
partnerships, will not disqualify the transaction from
satisfying the continuity of interest and continuity of
business enterprise requirements. 62 Fed. Reg. 361 (Jan. 3,
1997).
CAPITAL ASSETS. The taxpayer was employed full-
time as an engineer and devoted 10-20 hours per week
investing in the stock market. The stock trades were made
through a broker on the taxpayer’s account. The court held
that the taxpayer’s gains and losses from the stock trades
were capital gains and losses because the taxpayer was not
in the business of trading stocks for others. Hart v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-11.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The IRS
has issued rulings under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) before and after
amendment by the Small Business Job Protection Act of
1996. Under the new version of Section 104(a)(2), back
pay received in satisfaction of a claim for denial of a
promotion due to employment discrimination under Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is not excludible from
gross income except where the back pay is paid for medical
care or emotional distress. Under the pre-1996 version of
Section 104(a)(2), back pay received in satisfaction of a
claim for denial of a promotion due to employment
discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
is not excludible from gross income except where the
amount paid is for emotional distress. Under both versions,
the includible amount is wages for purposes of FICA and
FUTA. Rev. Rul. 96-65, I.R.B. 1996-__, __.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-A L M §
4.02[15].* The IRS has issued proposed regulations that
provide ordering rules for the reduction of bases of
property under I.R.C. §§ 108, 1017. The regulations will
affect taxpayers that exclude discharge of indebtedness
from gross income under Section 108. Taxpayers generally
must reduce specified tax attributes, including adjusted
bases of properties, to the extent income from discharge of
indebtedness is excluded from gross income under Section
108. Section 1017 provides rules regarding any basis
reductions required by, or elected under, Section 108. The
proposed regulations generally retain the “tracing”
approach of the existing regulations issued under prior law.
Thus, the proposed regulations require a taxpayer to reduce
the adjusted basis of the property that secured the
discharged indebtedness before reducing the adjusted bases
of other property.
The proposed regulations modify the categories in the
existing regulations to simplify the process of basis
reduction. First, the distinction between purchase-money
indebtedness and other secured indebtedness is eliminated.
Second, the order of basis reduction for property that
secured discharged indebtedness is changed. Thus, the first
category of the general ordering rule is real property used
in the taxpayer's trade or business or held for the
production of income (other than Section 1221(1) real
property) that secured the discharged indebtedness, and the
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second category is personal property used in the taxpayer's
trade or business or held for the production of income
(other than inventory, accounts receivable, and notes
receivable) that secured the discharged indebtedness.
Therefore, if an indebtedness secured by a building, a
parcel of land used in the taxpayer's trade or business,
office equipment, and office furniture is discharged, the
taxpayer proportionately reduces the adjusted bases of the
building and the parcel of land, based upon their relative
adjusted bases, to the full extent of the excluded discharge
of indebtedness income before reducing the adjusted bases
of the office equipment and the office furniture.
The proposed regulations generally provide that a
taxpayer may freely choose whether or not to request that a
partnership reduce the partner's share of depreciable basis
in partnership property and thereby permit the taxpayer to
treat the partnership interest as depreciable property (or
depreciable real property). In addition, the proposed
regulations generally provide that the partnership is free to
grant or deny its consent. In order to prevent avoidance of
the general ordering rules of the proposed regulations
through the use of partnerships, however, a partner is
required to request consent if the partner owns (directly or
indirectly) more than 50 percent of the capital and profits
interests of the partnership, or if the partner receives a
distributive share of discharge of indebtedness income from
the partnership. In addition, the partnership is required to
grant consent if requests are made by partners owning
(directly or indirectly) an aggregate of more than 50
percent of the capital and profits interests of the
partnership.
The proposed regulations remove Sec. 301.9100-13T,
which governed elections under Section 108(b)(5), and add
new Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.108-4. Under the temporary
regulations, a taxpayer is required to make the election with
the taxpayer's federal income tax return for the taxable year
in which the discharge occurs, but is permitted to file an
election with an amended return, or claim for credit or
refund, if the taxpayer establishes reasonable cause for
failing to file the election with the original return. New
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.108-4 requires the taxpayer to make
the election on the timely filed (including extensions)
federal income tax return for the taxable year the taxpayer
has discharge of indebtedness income that is excluded
under Section 108(a). Therefore, a taxpayer that fails to
make the election on that return must request the
Commissioner's consent to file a late election under Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.108-4 as depreciable property (or
depreciable real property). In addition, the proposed
regulations generally provide that the partnership is free to
grant or deny its consent. In order to prevent avoidance of
the general ordering rules of the proposed regulations
through the use of partnerships, however, a partner is
required to request consent if the partner owns (directly or
indirectly) more than 50 percent of the capital and profits
interests of the partnership, or if the partner receives a
distributive share of COD income from the partnership. In
addition, the partnership is required to grant consent if
requests are made by partners owning (directly or
indirectly) an aggregate of more than 50 percent of the
capital and profits interests of the partnership.
    The proposed regulations provide that a partner
requesting a reduction in inside basis must make the
request before the due date (including extensions) for filing
the partner's federal income tax return for the taxable year
in which the partner has discharge of indebtedness income.
A partnership that consents to a basis reduction must
include a consent statement with its Form 1065 and must
also provide a copy of that statement to the affected partner
on or before the date the Form 1065 is filed. 62 Fed. Reg.
955 (Jan. 7, 1997).
IMPUTED INTEREST. I.R.C. § 7672(g) allows for an
amount which may be loaned to a qualified continuing care
facility without incurring imputed interest. The amount is
adjusted annually for inflation and the IRS has announced
that the amount for 1997 as $131,300. Rev. Rul. 96-64,
I.R.B. 1996-__.
IRA. The taxpayer had established an IRA with a credit
union. The taxpayer’s former spouse obtained a court
judgment for arrearages for child support payments and the
judgment was executed against the funds in the IRA. The
court held that the execution caused the IRA funds to be
included in the taxpayer’s gross income because (1) the
judgment was treated as a distribution to the taxpayer
because the execution satisfied a personal obligation of the
taxpayer and (2) the taxpayer failed to identify or present
evidence that the execution qualified for any exception.
The 10 percent penalty for early withdrawal was also
assessed. Vorwald v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-15.
MILEAGE DEDUCTION. The standard mileage rate
for 1997 is 31.5 cents per mile for business use, 12 cents
per mile for charitable use and 10 cents per mile for
medical and moving expense purposes. Rev. Proc. 96-63,
I.R.B. 1996-__.
PENALTIES. The IRS has issued a revised revenue
procedure for identifying circumstances under which the
disclosure on a taxpayer’s return of a position on an item is
adequate for the purpose of reducing the understatement of
income tax penalty of I.R.C. § 6662(d) and for the purpose
of avoiding the preparer penalty of I.R.C. § 6694(a).  Rev.
Proc. 96-58, I.R.B. 1996-50, 4, revising Rev. Proc. 95-55,
1995-1 C.B. 457.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in December
1996, the weighted average is 6.89 percent with the
permissible range of 6.20 to 7.44 percent (90 to 109 percent
permissable range) and 6.20 to 7.58 percent (90 to 110
percent permissable range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 96-
66, I.R.B. 1996-__, __.
QUALIFIED DEBT INSTRUMENTS.  The IRS has
announced the 1997 inflation adjusted amounts of debt
instruments which qualify for the 9 percent discount rate
limitation under I.R.C. §§ 483 and 1274:
Year of Sale 1274A(b) 1274A(c)(2)(A)
or Exchange Amount Amount
1997 $3,723,800 $2,659,900
The $3,723,800 figure is the dividing line for 1997 below
which (in terms of seller financing) the minimum interest
rate is the lesser of 9 percent or the Applicable Federal
Rate. Where the amount of seller financing exceeds the
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$3,723,800 figure, the imputed rate is 100 percent of the
AFR except in cases of sale-leaseback transactions, where
the imputed rate is 110 percent of AFR. If the amount of
seller financing is $2,659,900 or less (for 1997), both
parties may elect to account for the interest under the cash
method of accounting.  Rev. Rul. 96-63, I.R.B. 1996-_.
RETURNS. The taxpayer admitted to receiving
nonemployee compensation for 1992 and 1993 but failed to
file income tax returns. The taxpayer argued that the federal
income tax system was voluntary and did not require the
filing of the returns. The taxpayer expressed various tax
protester-type arguments such as not being a citizen of the
United States but only a citizen of Texas. The taxpayer did
agree that if the IRS ruled that the taxpayer was a taxpayer
subject to the return requirements, the taxpayer would file
amended returns, but the taxpayer refused to voluntarily
file the returns. The court upheld the IRS-assessed
deficiencies for self-employment and income tax with
additions under I.R.C. §§ 6651(a), 6654(a). Barcroft v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-5.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
EXPENSES. The taxpayer was the sole shareholder of a
professional S corporation. An employee of the corporation
was found to have embezzled funds from a client of the
corporation. The client sued the employee, the employee’s
estate after the employee died and the corporation. The
parties reached an agreement that the corporation would
pay the claim if the corporation was adjudicated to be a
beneficiary of a life insurance policy on the life of the
decedent employee. The corporation did make the payment
and claimed the payment as a business expense deduction.
The IRS argued that the deduction was not allowed because
the corporation did not include the embezzled funds in its
income. The court held that the embezzlement was an
action personal to the employee and not charged to the
corporation; therefore, the embezzled funds would not be
included in the corporation’s income.  The IRS also argued
that the payment was not an ordinary and necessary
expense of the corporation’s business. The court held that
the employee’s actions were part of the employee’s
services for the corporation; therefore, the claim against the
corporation arose out of the corporation’s business and was
deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense.
The court found that the corporation made the payment to
protect its business reputation and credit status. Musgrave
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1997-19.
SHAREHOLDERS.  The IRS has issued guidance for
making the election under Section 1302 of the Small
Business Protection of 1996, Pub. l. No. 104-188, 110 Stat.
1755, which allows an electing small business trust (ESBT)
to be a shareholder in an S corporation.  The ESBT trustee
must make the election by filing with the same IRS service
center as used by the S corporation a statement--
(1) containing the names, addresses, and taxpayer
identification number of all current potential beneficiaries,
the trust and the corporation;
(2) identifying the election under I.R.C. § 1361(e)(3);
(3) specifying the effective date of the election but not
earlier than two months and fifteen days after the filing;
(4) identifying the date stock was transferred t the trust;
(5) providing information demonstrating that all trust
beneficiaries are eligible shareholders and that the trust
meets the definitional requirements of I.R.C. § 1361(e).
Notice 97-12, I.R.B. 1997-_, __.
SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES. The IRS has issued
procedures for obtaining automatic extensions of time for
(1) furnishing Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement, to
employees, and (2) filing Form W-2 with the Social
Security Administration. The automatic extensions also
apply to Form 499R-2/W-2PR, Form W-2VI, Form W-
2GU, and Form W-2AS. Rev. Proc. 96-57, I.R.B. 1996-__.
The IRS has issued a revised revenue procedure
explaining the standard and alternative procedures for
preparing and filing Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement;
Form W-3, Transmittal of Income and Tax Statements;
Form 941, Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax Return; Form
W-4, Employee’s Withholding Allowance Certificate; and
Form W-5, Earned Income Credit Advance Payment
Certificate. Rev. Proc. 96-60, I.R.B. 1996-__, revising
Rev. Proc. 84-77, 1984-2 C.B. 753.
TRAVEL EXPENSES . The IRS has issued updated
procedures for determining the amount of travel expense
which will be deemed substantiated where a per diem
allowance is made under a reimbursement or other expense
allowance arrangement. The updated procedures also
provide an optional method for employees and self-
employed individuals for computing the deductible costs of
business meal and incidental expenses incurred while
traveling away from home. The new procedures are
effective April 1, 1996. Rev. Proc. 96-64, I.R.B. 1996-__,
revising Rev. Proc. 96-28, 1996-1 C.B. 686.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
CONSERVATION RESERVE PAYMENTS. The
parties entered into a three year cash lease for farm land at
$20,000 annual rent. The lease allowed the tenant the
option to extend the lease for two years. In the second year
the parties agreed to enroll the land in the federal
conservation reserve program (CRP) with the bid for the
rental chosen so that the landlord’s portion of the CRP rent
payments would approximate the $20,000 annual rent
under the lease. Almost all of the acres were accepted into
the CRP and the tenant paid the balance of the annual rent
not covered by the CRP payments. The tenant exercised the
option to extend the lease but the landlord claimed that the
tenant owed the annual $20,000 rent in addition to the CRP
payments. The tenant continued to possess the land after
the lease extension period and complied with the CRP
contracts. The landlord received the CRP payments and the
tenant attempted to pay the deficit of those payments under
the $20,000 annual rent. The tenant argued that the CRP
contract amended the lease to increase the lease term to
match the CRP contract term, with the tenant liable only for
the amount by which the CRP payments to the landlord fell
short of the $20,000 rent. The court found that the parties
had orally amended the lease to allow for payment of most
of the annual rent from the landlord’s share of the CRP
payments. The court held that the CRP contract did not
affect the lease, but the lease was amended by the oral
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agreement and the oral agreement terms continued in effect
during the time the tenant remained in possession after the
termination of the written lease term. The key elements
here were that the parties orally agreed to use of the CRP
payments for the rent, the tenants continued to comply with
the lease and CRP contract, and the landlord accepted the
CRP payments. Eagle Watch Investments, Inc. v. Smith,
924 P.2d 257 (Mont. 1996).
TERMINATION. A farm was owned by a parent who
entered into a 15 year written lease with one child. The
lease was recorded and required the filing of annual reports
by the tenant. The parent soon thereafter executed a
quitclaim deed of title to the farm to another child,
reserving a life estate in the parent and making the deed
subject to the existing lease to the other child. The parent
died and the title holder attempted to terminate the lease,
arguing that the death of the parent changed the lease to a
tenancy at will because the parent could not transfer more
than a life estate interest under the lease. The court found,
however, that the lease was created first, when the parent
still owned title in fee; therefore, the lease could extend
past any life estate created later. The title holder also
argued that the lease terms were breached because the
tenant failed to file an annual report. The court held that the
breach was not material in that the tenant kept adequate
records and in fact transferred the crop share portion to the
landlord each year. Mann v. Mann, 671 N.E.2d 73 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1996).
PROPERTY
BOUNDARIES. This case involved a dispute as to
whether the defendant cut down trees on the plaintiff’s
property. The property of both parties was originally owned
by one person, the plaintiff’s sister who was the
defendant’s mother. The previous owner had conveyed the
plaintiff’s portion to the plaintiff’s brother and the deed
recognized that a stone wall was the boundary of the
conveyed parcel. The previous owner never farmed on the
other side of the wall and had made some gravel test
drillings near the wall but never on the plaintiff’s side. The
defendant’s portion was approximately the number of acres
listed on the deed from the previous owner but the
defendant tried to do some farming on the plaintiff’s side of
the wall and had some trees harvested on the plaintiff’s side
of the wall. The court held that there was sufficient
evidence that the previous owner had intended to convey
all of the property up to the wall and treated that parcel as
belonging to the plaintiff. Thus, the court held that the
stone wall was the actual boundary between the properties.
Koennicke v. Maiorano, 682 A.2d 1046 (Conn. Ct. Ap.
1996).
WATER RIGHTS
NONTRIBUTORY RIGHTS. The plaintiff sold 900
acres of land to third parties who eventually sold the land to
the defendant. The initial sale was secured by a deed of
trust but neither the sale agreement not the trust mentioned
anything about water rights. After the initial sale but before
the subsequent sales, the new owner had the nontributory
water rights adjudicated. The subsequent sales provided
that the buyers assumed a portion of the original note given
for the first purchase of the land.  The plaintiff brought this
action for foreclosure and argued that the foreclosure
included the nontributory water rights. The court held that
the water rights were included in the foreclosure because
the water rights were directly tied to the land ownership.
The court held that the water rights existed prior to the
water rights adjudication, again because the water rights
were connected to the land. The court also held that the
deed of trust included the water rights as security. Bayou
Land Co. v. Talley, 924 P.2d 136 (Colo. 1966).
ZONING
NONCONFORMING USE. The petitioners had
applied for a permit to construct a nonfarm building, a
residence, on land zoned as exclusive farm use (EFU). The
county zoning board approved the permit but the Land Use
Board of Appeals (LUBA) reversed and remanded. The
county had based its approval on two grounds—(1) the
petitioners had maintained a mobile home on the spot since
before the zoning change and (2) the nonfarm building
would be located on one acre of land which was not
suitable for farming. The petitioner had also argued that the
dwelling would be used in conjunction with the petitioners’
horse boarding business on neighboring property; therefore,
the acre building site was not unsuitable for farming. The
petitioners claimed that the boarding of horses qualified as
the production of livestock. The county board ruled against
the petitioners on this issue. The LUBA reversed on both
reasons. The court ruled on only the nonconforming use
issue. The LUBA had ruled that, because the boarding of
horses involved grazing and grazing was a normal part of
raising horses, the petitioners use of the land was not a
nonconforming use. The court held that grazing alone was
insufficient evidence of production of livestock and
remanded the case to LUBA for a decision based on that
rule. Moore v. Coos County, 925 P.2d 929 (Or. Ct. App.
1996).
CITATION UPDATES
Coohey v. United States, 97-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,113 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (deferred payment contracts) see
article by N. Harl, Vol. 7, p. 183.
Delaney v. Comm’r, 99 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1996) (court






FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS
PLANNING by Dr. Neil E. Harl
January 6-10, 1997
You missed it, a week in paradise. Plan now
for next year’s seminar on the Big Island of
Hawaii for a week of sun, surf and estate and
business planning. Next year’s dates are
tentatively set for January 5-9, 1998.
Spend a week in Hawai'i in January 1998! Balmy trade
winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand beaches and
the rest of paradise can be yours; plus a world-class seminar
on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl.
The seminar is tentatively scheduled for January 7-11, 1998
at the beautiful ocean-front Royal Waikoloan Resort on the
Big Island, Hawai'i.
Watch your mail for more details or call Robert
Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $100
per year or $35 each.
For your copy, send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405.
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